I believe the next bubble to burst will be the looming
student loan crisis. After our discussion about coalitions, I got to thinking
that by teaming up with the federal government, these student loan agencies
have devised an extremely powerful union of which will ultimately have a disastrous
impact on the economy at large. If a loaning bureau can find a way to hedge its
risk, the consequence of that hedge will ultimately always fall back onto the
people receiving the said loan. I see many parallels between the sub-prime
mortgage crisis and this student loan problem. Let me explain.
In simplistic terms, mortgage companies would – in the
beginning – only lend money for mortgages to people with good credit ratings.
They would then bundle these mortgages into something called a CDO and then
sell them off to investors. These investors would then turn around and sell it
to some other entity (hedge fund, etc) creating a continuing cycle of
profitable exchange. This was great for the simple reason that it was both
profitable and safe to do – largely because the only people with mortgages were
those with sound ratings of credit. Yet, eventually the mortgage brokers ran
out of people that met the necessary levels of credit to lend to. In order to combat
this problem the brokers simply lower their credit threshold in order to find
more applicants. By continuing to lower the threshold, it got to the point
where people with no income, no job or assets (NINJA Loans) could take out huge
sums of money to buy a house. Why was this? Because the broker knew that once he bundled
the risky loans with the safer BBB loans and the safest AAA loans, thus creating
a CDO, he would be able to quickly sell it to his usual investor – essentially pushing
all of that risk onto that investor. It also made sense for the investor to buy
that CDO for the same exact reason – he knew he could then flip it to his guys
and so on and so forth. As long as you are not the last man in line, then who
really cares how risky the loan may be.
Of course, with more and more sub-prime mortgages being
thrown into the pot, the more risky each CDO became. At first it didn't really
matter if someone defaulted on their loan because then the investor would simply
seize the house. They could turn around and sell it to someone else. The
problem was that when default rates started to rise significantly, investors
became stuck with too many overpriced houses that no one on the market was
willing to purchase. It soon became obvious that people were buying and selling
an “asset” that was essentially worthless – thus forcing the whole process to
come to a screeching halt.
What does this have to do with the student loan crisis?
Well, it was only advantageous for mortgage brokers to loan to safe candidates
until they could find a way to circumvent the risk of loaning to lesser
qualified applicants. The same can be said about student loan agencies, or any
loaning bureau for that matter. If the student loaning agencies could find a
way to hedge their own risk, they too could go the route of the mortgage
brokers and reap the greedy benefits in the process. Luckily for these agencies, the Obama
Administration has made it a key initiative to send as many people to college
as possible. By using the federal government as a backer – essentially hedging
their risk with the most powerful organization in the world – these student
loan agencies were now free to loan to whomever they damn well pleased. It doesn't matter whether or not someone looks like they will be able to pay back
a hefty loan because the government tells them that no matter what happens that
loan will not be forgiven. (Supposedly there is some discussion about possible loan
forgiveness, but I don’t see that happening until a full-blown epidemic is at
hand).
We learned that coalitions negatively affect the efficiency
and growth of a society by increasing the complexity of regulation and the role
of government. By doing this, Olson argues that these coalitions can change the
direction of social evolution for the worse. It seems clear to me that these
student loan agencies – by colluding under the guise of extreme greed – have negatively
affected our society’s direction of social evolution. As long as the government
is willing to take the risk away from the loaning agencies, there is nothing to
stop the agencies from loaning to anyone who wishes to go to college. The fact
is that a large percentage of students currently in college probably should not
be there. We see people all the time who take out substantial loans so that
they can get a completely worthless degree in Art History or English or any
other related field that carries with it a very weak return on investment. No
disrespect to those majors but it is quite unsound to take out, say, $80,000 to
go to a private school majoring in a degree that will pay you next to nothing
once you graduate.
What we need to see is a substantial decrease in not only
the number of students attending college but also a decrease in the number of
administrators; not to mention the ceasing of frivolous spending practices on
sculptures, landscaping and the like – all of which adds to the ever-burgeoning
increases in college tuition. A reduction across the board would be wise.
It makes perfect sense for the loaning agencies to form a
coalition because their selective incentives to do so are abundant; the same
cannot be said for students. I believe the selective incentives that were once
very much alive for students are now corroding away. This is because students
are no longer learning hard skills that can be easily transferred into the
working sector. Why spend all of this money on higher education if it only
marginally benefits your status from your non-educated peers? The gap is
nowhere near what it was two or three generations ago. It has closed
substantially. But I suppose this avenue of thinking is better left for a
separate discussion.
In any case, we will not see dramatic changes to the system
until default rates reach extremely disturbing proportions. Only then will
people realize that college is perhaps not the once-sound investment that it
previously claimed to be.